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However, voluntary inhibition is not the only form of behavioural control. For example, many simple, everyday activities (e.g., scanning a visual scene) require large numbers of similar -but not identical -movements. Therefore, automatic inhibition of the movement that has just been executed in favour of one of the alternatives would prevent perseveration and thus increase efficiency. A classical example of such a non-voluntary inhibitory mechanism is the so-called Inhibition of Return (IOR) phenomenon, where orienting and responding towards a spatial location is impaired if attention has just been removed from this location ( Klein, 2000; Maylor, 1985) . This kind of inhibitory control is assumed to be mediated by subcortical structures, specifically by the superior colliculus (see Klein, 2000, for an overview). This structure, in contrast to cortical (frontal) areas, matures very early during brain development. Correspondingly, IOR has been observed not only in adults, but also in children and infants ( Clohessy, Posner, Rothbart, & Vecera, 1991; MacPherson, Klein, & Moore, 2003; Richards, 2000) . Interestingly, when comparing the development of strategic and automatic control processes, MacPherson et al. (2003) found that children between five and ten years of age showed IOR when their attention was exogenously removed from the initially attended location, but not when they had to shift attention endogenously. This is in line with the notion of subcortically mediated (early maturing) automatic control and cortically mediated (late maturing) strategic control processes.
Automatic inhibitory control would also be beneficial under conditions where voluntary control mechanisms are not only impractical, but impossible. Many potentially relevant changes in the environment are too quick or too subtle to be consciously perceived. It is well known that such 'subliminal' stimuli can nevertheless activate a motor response (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Neumann & Klotz, 1994) . The question is whether subliminally triggered responses are also subject to inhibitory control. In fact, it has often been argued that response inhibition depends on the conscious detection of task-relevant signals, and thus is not available with subliminal stimulation. Studies of inhibitory control comparing subliminal and supraliminal presentation conditions have generally confirmed this hypothesis (e.g. Allport, Tipper, & Chmiel, 1985; Marcel, 1980; McCormick, 1997; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995; Neill, Valdez, & Terry, 1995) : Although automatic activation processes were observed with both types of stimuli, evidence for response inhibition was found only with supraliminal stimuli. This led to the conclusion that subliminally presented stimuli can trigger only (passive) activation, and that for active inhibition to occur, stimuli have to be presented supraliminally.
These experiments, however, only investigated voluntary or strategic inhibitory control processes -it is easy to see why these might not be operative when 9 http://www.ac-psych.org be mapped to the same response (compatible trial) or to different responses (incompatible trial), or the prime can be a stimulus that never occurs as a target and, thus, is not mapped to any response (neutral trial).
Because of the visual backward masking, prime stimuli are presented below the threshold of conscious awareness, as evidenced by chance level accuracy in numerous prime identification tasks ( Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998 Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 1997) . Despite this, primes systematically affect motor responses to the subsequent supraliminal targets, with the direction of these priming effects depending on the interval between masked prime and target. When targets follow the masked primes immediately (mask--target stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA] of 0 ms), positive compatibility effects (PCEs) occur, where performance is facilitated on compatible trials, and impaired on incompatible trials, relative to neutral trials ( Aron et al., 2003; Eimer, 1999; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 1997 . With increasing mask-target SOA, however, PCEs diminish and turn into negative compatibility effects (NCEs), with performance benefits on incompatible trials, and costs on compatible trials, at mask-target SOAs of 100 ms or more (Aron et al., 2003; Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998 , 2001 Klapp & Haas, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 1997 , 2001 , 2004b Schlaghecken, Münchau, Bloem, Rothwell, & Eimer, 2003; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004) .
These effects seem to originate within the perceptuomotor control system, rather than reflecting perceptual or cognitive-semantic processes (Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Eimer, Schubö, & Schlaghecken, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000) . In fact, electrophysiological and haemodynamic evidence (e.g., Aron et al., 2003; Dehaene et al., 1998; Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Praamstra & Seiss, 2005; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004) indicates that the masked prime activates its corresponding motor response, which in turn increases inhibition of the competing response alternative. When the target is presented immediately after the prime (mask-target SOA of 0 ms), target-related motor processes will begin during this initial prime-related activation phase.
Because the prime activated the correct response on compatible trials, but the incorrect response on incompatible trials, the target-related activity will be correspondingly facilitated (on compatible trials) or impaired (on incompatible trials), reflected in behavioural PCEs.
However, the duration of this initial activation phase is cut short by the presentation of the masking stimulus.
Because a successful mask removes the prime's neural representation , 1 the initially primed response is no longer supported by corresponding unequivocal input from the perceptual system. It is assumed that this sudden lack of supporting perceptual evidence triggers an active self-inhibition process, which suppresses the initially primed response and, consequently, releases its competitor from inhibition ( Bowman, Schlaghecken, & Eimer, in press; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; & Druey, in press). Such strategic processes are assumed to be mediated by frontal cortical areas (Band & van Boxtel, 1999; Faw, 2003) . Consequently, according to the hypothesis that these areas mature during adolescence (Casey et al., 2001) , age-related differences in repetition costs should be obtained, with the youngest children showing the largest costs, similar to findings of larger task switching costs ( Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzales de Sather, 2001; Reimers & Maylor, 2005) and larger flanker interference effects (e.g., Enns & Girgus, 1985; Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 1995) in children compared to young adults.
INHIBITORY CONTROL IN CHILDREN AND YOUNG ADULTS
Based on these considerations, a dissociation between response repetition effects (repetition costs) and priming effects (NCE) was expected in the present experiment.
The former was expected to show age-related differences, with larger effects -indicating less effective inhibitory control -for younger children. In contrast, the latter was expected to be largely unaffected by age. In particular, even younger children where expected to produce significant NCEs, suggesting that low-level self-inhibitory control is already operational at this age. Conversely, if self-inhibition processes were not yet sufficiently developed in younger children, then this group should show PCEs rather than NCEs (indicating prime-related response activation without subsequent self-inhibition).
Method

Participants
Sixty-four volunteers participated in the experiment. 
Procedure
Participants were seated at a table in front of a laptop computer at a distance of 50 -60 cm from the screen.
They were instructed to maintain central eye fixation, and to respond with a left-hand key press to arrows pointing to the left, and with a right-hand key press to arrows pointing to the right. Response keys were the left and right SHIFT keys of the computer keyboard. Each trial began with the presentation of the central fixation stimulus for 350 ms, followed by a 350-ms blank screen, followed by a centrally presented and immediately masked prime. Mask duration was 100 ms.
In the masked prime RT task, primes were presented for 17 ms. Fifty ms after offset of the 100-ms mask, a target was presented for 100 ms, randomly and with equal probability either directly above or below fixation. Inter-Trial-Interval (ITI) was 2,600 ms. In the prime identification task, no target stimuli were presented after the mask. Prime duration was varied in a one-down/two-up staircase procedure such that on the first trial, prime duration was maximal (167 ms), and was on subsequent trials shortened in 17-ms steps (down to a minimum of 17 ms) whenever participants gave the correct response. Conversely, when participants made an incorrect response, prime duration on the next trial was prolonged by 33 ms. Participants had to respond to the direction of the masked prime arrow, and were instructed to "just guess" on trials where they did not consciously perceive the prime arrow. They were informed about the staircase procedure, and were told that during this part, only response accuracy, but not response speed, was of relevance. ITI was again 2,600 ms.
Results
Twelve participants had problems with the demands of the masked prime RT task (producing overall error rates of more than 15% and/or failing to give a response on more than 10% of all trials and/or pro- 
Masked prime RT task
For compatible, neutral, and incompatible trials in the masked prime RT task, ANOVAs were computed on mean correct RTs and on error rates for the variables Compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible) and Age. Performance data (RTs and error rates) on each trial type and priming effects are presented in Table 1 .
Error rates were somewhat higher in the 7-8 year olds than in the other two groups, F(2, 42) = 4.66, p = .015.
There were no other effects on error rates (main effect of compatibility, and Age x Compatibility interaction: both Fs < 1, both ps > .5, both βs > .8). It should be noted, though, that there was at least a numerical NCE (fewer errors for incompatible than for compatible trials) for each age group, indicating that the NCE on RTs does not reflect a speed/accuracy trade-off. However, this effect was significant only for the oldest group, t(10) = 2.17, p = .028, one-tailed, both other ts < 1, both ps > .4.
Overall RTs decreased with increasing age, F(2, 42) = 22.39, p < .001, and were longer on compatible and neutral trials than on incompatible trials, F(2, 84) = 6.39, p = .004, ε = .913. Importantly, these effects did not significantly interact, F < 1, β = .94.
In fact, subsequent one-tailed paired t-tests confirmed that RTs were significantly longer on compatible than on incompatible trials in each group: t(17) = 2.04, 
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To account for the general RT decrease with increasing age, follow-up analyses were conducted on scaled priming effects, calculated by dividing RT on compatible trials by RT on incompatible trials for each participant separately. These analyses confirmed that each group produced significant NCEs (indicated by a scaled value larger than 1), t(17) = 2.02, p = .030, t(15) = 2.52, p = .012, and t(10) = 3.19, p = .005, for the 7-8 year olds, the 11-12 year olds, and the 16-23 year olds, respectively. Again, the size of these effects did not differ significantly between groups, F < 1, β = .81.
Response repetition effects
Mean RTs on response repetition trials (trials requiring the same response as the immediately preceding trial) were compared with mean RTs on response alternation trials (trials requiring a different response than the immediately preceding trial). In either case, only trials where both the current response and the preceding response were correct were taken into account. Mean RTs on each trial type and repetition effects are presented in Table 2 .
Responses were generally slower on repetition trials than on alternation trials, F(1, 42) = 43.22, p < .001. Importantly, this effect interacted with age, F(2, 42) = 7.66, p = .001, being largest for the 7-8 year olds, intermediate for the 11-12 year olds, and smallest for the 16-23 year olds. Again, the same pattern was observed when effect size was scaled (by calculating repetition costs as RT on repetition trials divided by RT on alternation trials for each participant separately): Younger children still showed the largest, and young adults still showed the smallest repetition costs, F(2, 42) = 4.83, p = .013.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated masked motor priming effects in young (7-8 years) and older (11-12 years) children and in young adults. Results were fully in line with the predictions: Prime identification performance indicated that participants were not able to reliably identify masked primes presented for 17 or 33 ms, suggesting that the 17-ms masked primes employed in the RT task were subliminal. In the masked prime RT task, younger children produced, unsurprisingly, substantially longer RTs than older children, who in turn produced longer RTs than young adults. Nevertheless, as expected, all three groups showed significant priming effects in the form of NCEs. The size of the NCE did not show any statistical difference between age groups. In contrast, response repetition effects showed a significant decrease with increasing age.
Summary: Low-level and high-level inhibitory control
Obviously, it is not possible to base any firm conclusion on a failure to reject the null hypothesis: Not finding a significant difference in NCEs between age groups 
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does not prove that there is none. Furthermore, the high β-value for the relevant interaction (i.e., the low observed power) indicates that it might be extremely difficult to ever find a statistically significant difference, even if it existed. Therefore, it is not possible to directly draw the conclusion that children and young adults produce the same masked priming effects.
Low-level control: The NCE
However, in line with the hypothesis, the data clearly show that children do produce significant
NCEs. This finding stands in marked contrast to results from a study investigating masked priming effects in old age (Schlaghecken & Maylor, 2005) , where older participants (mean age: 75.6 years)
showed substantial priming effects in the form of PCEs when targets followed the masked primes immediately, but failed to produce reliable NCEs when target onset was delayed. In the present context, the relevant aspect of this finding is that it is consistent with the assumption that the NCE reflects self-inhibition and disinhibition processes mediated by the basal ganglia, as this structure -in particular the neostriatum -shows substantial age-related volume loss (e.g., Raz, 2001) . 
High-level control: Response repetition costs
High-level or strategic processes are generally assumed to be a function of executive control processes mediated by anterior -specifically prefrontal -cortical areas (e.g., Band & van Boxtel, 1999; Dempster, 1992; Faw, 2003; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1994; Spence & Frith, 1999) . Because maturation of the frontal cortex continues well into adolescence (Casey et al., 2001) , it is not surprising to find that voluntary control continues to 
'Emergency brake' and alternative interpretations of the NCE
Withholding a response to a clearly visible but -as per instruction -response-irrelevant stimulus requires voluntary, high-level inhibitory control mechanisms. In contrast, it seems likely that suppressing a response tendency triggered by a subliminal prime involves processes generated at low-level and automatic stages of the visuomotor system. As outlined above, we assume that the prime triggers an activation of its corresponding motor response, and that a self-inhibition process actively suppresses this initial response tendency when it is suddenly no longer supported by sensory evidence . However, alternative interpretations of the NCE have been put forward recently ( Lleras & Enns, 2004; Verleger, Jaśkowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004) . According to these accounts, the NCE does not reflect self-inhibition of the initially primed response, but simply activation of the opposite response triggered by task-relevant features contained in the mask.
With respect to this alternative interpretation, it is of particular interest to note that the NCE -but not the preceding PCE with short mask-target SOA -is reduced or even absent in older adults (Schlaghecken & Maylor, 2005; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004) , indicating that ageing selectively affects low-level self-inhibition and/or disinhibition processes, but leaves low-level activation processes unaltered. In contrast, the 'activate-the-opposite' hypothesis can not account for the selective age-related changes ( Klapp, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004a) . Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the NCE does in fact reflect low-level self-inhibition of the primed response (and corresponding disinhibition of the alternative response) rather than mask-induced low--level activation of the opposite response.
This type of inhibition appears to be fundamentally different from voluntary, high-level inhibitory control, which requires conscious awareness of the task-relevant stimuli and is mediated by anterior cortical areas.
A recent fMRI study with young, healthy adults (Aron et al., 2003) found self-inhibition and disinhibition in the masked prime task to be associated with signal changes in the thalamus and the basal ganglia. Activation was also observed in the posterior parietal cortex, but not in the prefrontal cortex or in other anterior areas . This finding stands in marked contrast to the prefrontal activation usually obtained in studies of (voluntary) response inhibition in stop-signal or go/nogo tasks (e.g., Konishi et al., 1998; Menon et al., 2001 ). However, the result is consistent with the notion that whereas anterior brain areas mediate voluntary control processes, unconscious processing and automatic motor control are a function of posterior parietal ( Pisella et al., 2000) and subcortical (e.g., Heyder, Suchan, & Daum, 2004; Kelly et al., 2004) circuits. In line with this, evidence has been obtained that self-inhibition (as evidenced by the NCE) is unaffected by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation of anterior (motor and premotor) structures , but is substantially altered in patients with basal gangliarelated movement disorders (Aron et al., 2003; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004) . Together with the present findings, these results provide converging evidence that self-inhibition in the masked prime task can be regarded as a low-level, automatic control process, which is mediated largely by subcortical structures and does not involve central executive processes in anterior cortical areas.
Automatic control and the role of intentions
The pattern of results from the present experiment is consistent with the notion that automatic processes develop earlier than controlled processes (for a review, see Plude, Enns, & Brodeur 1994 ) that a subliminally triggered motor activation will be inhibited whenever (1) it is relatively strong and, thus, has the potential to affect overt behaviour, but (2) the perceptual evidence for this activation has suddenly disappeared (as in the case of successful backward masking).
Interestingly, though, it appears that these automatic control processes are not independent of current intentions. In several studies, it has been demonstrated that the impact of subliminally presented primes on behavior is mediated by the currently active task set.
If primes do not match the set of stimulus-response (S-R) mappings imposed by the task instructions, and applied by the participant, then they will cease to exert any influence on overt motor responses (e.g., Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Haas, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004b) . Thus while subliminal stimuli might trigger processes that are clearly low-level and automatic (outside voluntary control), these processes nevertheless depend on highlevel intentional states. Presumably, the intention to respond, for example, with a left finger movement to an arrow pointing to the left and with a right finger movement to an arrow pointing to the right results in a specific 'configuration' of the perceptuo-motor system, which makes it particulary susceptible to certain inputs (i.e., left-and right-pointing arrows) and particularly likely to execute certain responses (left and right finger movements). However, once this intention has been implemented (i.e., once the perceptuo-motor system has been configured in the required way), low--level control processes can occur without higher-level or voluntary 'supervision,' such that if a strong initial activation is suddenly no longer supported by sensory evidence, it will automatically self-inhibit.
We have demonstrated that such a system will only require local self-inhibition circuits, without the need for top-down inhibitory executive control mechanisms (Bowman et al., in press ). Self-inhibition is a basic functional principle in cognitive control and a common mechanism in the nervous system ( Arbuthnott, 1995) .
Because of its relative simplicity, it seems reasonable to assume that this mechanism is one of the earliest to develop both phylogenetically and ontogenetically (although we are not aware of any studies investigating this issue yet). If this assumption is correct, then it should be possible to observe comparable NCEs not only in adults and children, but also in non-human animals. Such studies could help to shed more light on the function of fundamental, low-level control processes that allow an organism to adjust its ongoing behaviour quickly and flexibly to rapid changes in its enviroment.
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2 Alternative interpretations of the NCE which do not assume the existence of inhibitory control processes will be considered in the General Discussion.
3
For various reasons, seven children did not successfully complete the experiment: some walked out before the end of the experiment, some took short breaks during an experimental block, others completed the experiment but then admitted that they had not really been able to see the stimuli because they had forgotten their glasses, etc. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any studies investigating the correlation between switch costs and repetition costs, which would allow us to test this hypothesis directly.
